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PROTECTING HOMEOWNERS AND PRESERVING AFFORDABLE
HOUSING: HOW NEW YORK CITY’S THIRD PARTY TRANSFER
PROGRAM CAN BE REFORMED TO BETTER SERVE BOTH ENDS
Kegan Sheehan*
I. INTRODUCTION
As in many other localities, New York City’s taxation of real
property is its most significant source of revenue, representing 31
percent in 2017.1 Consequently, every state has laws authorizing
municipalities to sell tax-delinquent properties through tax lien
foreclosures in order to collect unpaid municipal arrears.2 Generally, a
taxing authority places a lien on a property when taxes are unpaid, and
in some cases, other municipal property charges go unpaid for a
statutorily designated period.3 In most jurisdictions, a municipality will
enforce the lien itself or, more commonly, sell the lien to a private
purchaser.4 Whether a government or private third party, the
lienholder will assess interest and fees on the taxpayer and, if the
balance of the lien goes unpaid for a period of time, acquire the property
through tax lien foreclosure.5
The importance of property tax revenue to municipal budgets
makes tax collection the primary motivation for tax foreclosures. In

* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Vassar College.
1 N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFF., UNDERSTANDING NEW YORK CITY’S BUDGET: A GUIDE 11
(2021), https://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/understandingthebudget.pdf. Other
local governments rely even more heavily on property tax revenue, with such taxes
accounting for 46.5 percent of local government revenues nationwide in 2017. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 State & Local Gov’t Finance Datasets and Tables,
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2017/econ/local/public-use-datasets.html.
2 Caroline Enright, Note, Someone to Lien On: Privatization of Delinquent Property
Tax Liens and Tax Sale Surplus in Massachusetts, 61 B.C. L. REV. 667, 669 (2020).
3 Id.; James Saintsing, Note, Constitutional Law—Tax Sales: Notice to Interested
Parties, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1984).
4 Frank S. Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 IND. L.J. 747, 772
(2000); Enright, supra note 2, at 669. There is much variation in the tax enforcement
schemes employed by jurisdictions throughout the country. Alexander, supra, at 772–
74.
5 Id.
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cities facing housing affordability crises, however, the creation and
preservation of affordable housing is another critical interest served by
the use of tax foreclosures. The cost of living in cities like New York
continues to displace all but the most affluent residents.6 In an effort to
reverse this trend, many municipalities have implemented programs
aimed at creating affordable housing for low- and moderate-income
residents.7 Vacant and distressed properties provide appealing
opportunities for localities looking to increase their affordable housing
stock. Accordingly, tax foreclosure offers a readymade solution to an
increasingly dire problem.
Unfortunately, the use of tax foreclosures can also exacerbate the
affordability crises by stripping affected property owners of a source of
wealth that can help promote social mobility and ultimately reduce
displacement. In some jurisdictions, lienholders take full title to a
property through tax foreclosure without owing the original
homeowner anything, unlike regular residential foreclosures, where the
homeowner automatically receives any surplus funds after the sale.8
Moreover, many affordable housing initiatives that benefit from the
infusion of tax foreclosed properties fail to provide permanent
affordability,9 further problematizing the use of tax foreclosure as a
sound avenue for affordable housing development.
Therefore, it is critical municipalities strike the right balance in
crafting their tax enforcement schemes to ensure they sufficiently
protect homeowners and—when it is necessary to foreclose—that
affected properties are funneled into affordable housing programs that
ensure permanent affordability. Some models provide promise in this
area; land banks, mutual housing associations (MHAs), limited equity
cooperatives, and community land trusts (CLTs) create and preserve
affordable housing while providing opportunities for low- and
moderate-income residents to build wealth through ownership.10 For
example, in some areas of the country, land banks acquire tax foreclosed
properties, clear liens, and sell them to CLTs.11 The CLTs, in turn,

Julie Gilgoff, Note, Local Responses to Today’s Affordable Housing Crisis:
Permanently Affordable Housing Models, 20 CUNY L. REV. 587, 588 (2017).
7 Id. at 588–89.
8 See Enright, supra note 2, at 669.
9 Gilgoff, supra note 6, at 589.
10 See infra Part V.
11 KATHARINE NELSON & DAVID TROUTT, RUTGERS CTR. ON L., INEQ. & METRO. EQUITY, LAND
BANKS AS INSTRUMENTS OF EQUITABLE GROWTH: CLIME’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CITY OF
NEWARK 1–3 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b996f553917ee5e584
6
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separate the ownership rights of a home from the land on which it sits,
allowing the property to be sold to residents at a reduced cost.12
Given the great complexity and variety of property tax enforcement
schemes employed by state and local governments throughout the
country,13 this Comment focuses narrowly on the City of New York’s
Third Party Transfer (“TPT”) program to highlight the common
problems caused by municipalities’ use of tax foreclosures. Importantly,
the TPT program is but a piece of the City of New York’s tax enforcement
strategy. Its history, purpose, and impact, however, are a useful case
study for understanding both the promise and problems of
municipalities’ use of tax foreclosure. In particular, by analyzing and
critiquing TPT, this Comment seeks to provide a framework for other
localities trying to combat the dual problems of property tax
delinquency and affordable housing shortages.
Part II provides an overview of New York’s use of tax foreclosures
to combat widespread housing disinvestment and abandonment. It
highlights the concerns underlying the City’s tax foreclosure efforts, as
well as the problems caused by this practice. Part III explains the TPT
process and examines the program’s impact on New York City residents
today. Part IV considers what about the TPT program works and what
does not. Finally, Part V recommends reforms the New York City Council
should enact to better tailor the TPT program to the important goal of
preserving permanently affordable housing while also preserving
homeownership opportunities in communities of color. Additionally, it
outlines how government can use land banks, CLTs, and MHAs to better
serve communities at risk of losing equity and being displaced when a
municipality uses tax foreclosures to create and preserve affordable
housing.
Notably, the New York housing market is unique.14 But other large
cities are running into similarly high costs of living.15 As the economic
fallout of the global coronavirus pandemic exacerbates property tax
ba742/t/5f87599557745c26fdce52dd/1602705815216/Updated+CLiME+-+Land+
Banks+Best+Practices+and+Recs+kln.pdf.
12 Id. at 3.
13 See Alexander, supra note 4, at 770.
14 Several characteristics unique to New York City explain the widespread
abandonment that gave rise to the City’s use of tax foreclosures: (1) an unusual
dependence on rental housing; (2) a propensity for undertaking large-scale public
housing development projects; and (3) rent regulation and its attendant turbulence
amidst countervailing political pressures. Frank Braconi, In Re In Rem: Innovation and
Expediency in New York’s Housing Policy, in HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NEW
YORK CITY: FACING THE FUTURE 95 (Michael H. Shill ed., 1999).
15 See Gilgoff, supra note 6, at 588.
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delinquency and distress problems in more localities, New York’s
approach, coupled with the recommendations contained herein, offers
a useful model for cities to proactively address two critical needs:
property tax compliance and the preservation of safe, affordable
housing.
II. NEW YORK CITY’S HISTORICAL EFFORTS TO CURB DISINVESTMENT AND
ABANDONMENT THROUGH IN REM FORECLOSURE
Paul Saunders lives in a three-story brownstone in the rapidly
gentrifying Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn, NY.16 His
septuagenarian parents purchased the home nearly forty years ago at a
time when Mr. Saunders remembers “not even being able to walk safely
down [the] block. . . .”17 Today, however, the neighborhood is
“prosperous” and “things are happening.”18
The Saunders’ home, and the many brownstones surrounding it,
are some of the most sought-after properties in all of New York City. In
just the ten-year period from 2006–2016, Brooklyn experienced the
biggest surge in home prices in the City, with the average home value
increasing fifty percent.19 In November 2017, the Saunders’ home
appraised for over $1.2 million,20 a far cry from the $75,000 buyers paid
for Crown Heights properties in 1984 (about $206,342 in inflation-

See Taking Stock: A Look into the Third Party Transfer Program in Modern Day New
York: Hearing Before the Comms. on Hous. & Bldgs. and Oversight & Investigations, 2018–
21 N.Y.C. Council 15 (July 22, 2019) [hereinafter TPT Hearing] (statement of Paul
Saunders), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=7562120&GUID=CD2
7B123-D36B-4910-A18C-CDFED1A6229F; Stephen Witt, City Caught Trying to Grab
Senior Citizen’s Brownstone, POLITICS NY (Sept. 17, 2018), https://politicsny.com/
2018/09/17/1217-dean-street/.
17 TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 22–23.
18 Id. at 23.
19 Robert Demeter, Was Buying an NYC Home a Good Investment During the Past
Decade?, PROPERTYSHARK (May 7, 2018), https://www.propertyshark.com/Real-EstateReports/2018/05/07/was-buying-an-nyc-home-a-good-investment-during-the-pastdecade/.
20 Stephen Witt & Kelly Mena, City Sits on Brownstone as Elderly Woman Waits on
Bated Breath, POLITICS NY (Oct. 26, 2018), https://politicsny.com/2018/10/26/city-sitson-brownstone-as-elderly-woman-waits-on-bated-breath/.
16
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adjusted dollars).21 Overall home prices in New York City had increased
by 250 percent from 1974 to 2006.22
Considering this profound increase in equity, you can imagine the
Saunders shock when, in September 2018, they discovered a notice
posted on their door from the City of New York, indicating ownership of
their property had been transferred to a local developer.23 Having just
visited the City’s Department of Finance (DOF) mere months before and
made a payment to ensure the property was up to date on outstanding
taxes, the Saunders were understandably distraught.24 Prior to the
September notice of transfer and following Mr. Saunders’s visit to the
DOF, he had received several notices indicating the fully paid-off, $1.2
million home was slated to be foreclosed on for an outstanding
municipal water bill of $3,792.20.25 Unbeknownst to the Saunders and
to the representatives they spoke with at both the DOF and the
Department of Environmental Protection, which handles water charges
in the City, their home had been swept up in a little known program
administered by the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD) called Third Party Transfer (TPT).26 New York
initiated the TPT program to encourage property tax compliance and
preserve its affordable housing stock.27
In order to understand why the City adopted the TPT program, it is
helpful to understand the state of housing in New York prior to the
program’s creation. Much of the housing landscape in 1980s New York
mirrored the neighborhood surrounding the Saunders’ Crown Heights
home. During the 1960s and 1970s, many New York City neighborhoods
Michael Decourcy Hinds, Resale-Home Prices: Up and Rising, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22,
1984),
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/22/realestate/resale-home-prices-upand-rising.html. The inflation-adjusted figures were calculated using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) Inflation Calculator on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics website, and
converting CPI data from August 1984 (the month the Saunders purchased their Crown
Heights home) to March 2022 figures, which was the latest available CPI data at the time
the author used the calculator. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://
www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
22 N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 6, 9
(2008), https://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/State_of_the_City_2008.pdf.
23 See TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 15–18.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 8–9 (statement of Council Member Robert E. Cornegy, Jr.); Stephen Witt
& Kelly Mena, Cornegy Pushes Back Against De Blasio Plan to Seize More Private
Properties, POLITICS NY (Jan. 11, 2019), https://politicsny.com/2019/01/11/cornegypushes-back-against-de-blasio-plan-to-seize-more-private-properties/.
26 See TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 18.
27 Id. at 28–29 (statement of Louise Carroll, Comm’r, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. &
Dev.).
21
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experienced impoverishment and depopulation, which in turn
contributed to widespread housing abandonment.28
A. Taking Control
The widespread abandonment of buildings throughout New York
City raised two important concerns: it threatened the stock of safe,
habitable housing affordable to low-income New Yorkers, and it
compromised the City’s property tax base.29 Accordingly, the City
accelerated its use of in rem foreclosure actions to take control of
abandoned buildings by targeting those that had fallen behind on
property taxes.30 In 1976, the City enacted Local Law 45, which
shortened the amount of time municipal arrears on a multi-family
building had to be outstanding before the City could initiate a
foreclosure proceeding from three years to one.31 The hope was that
this shorter timeline would encourage more tax compliance or at least
allow the City to intervene before buildings deteriorated completely.32
This accelerated foreclosure had the effect of accelerating
abandonment. Unable to keep up with maintenance costs and taxes,
building owners increasingly abandoned buildings to avoid being
subject to legal action.33 Even buildings the City was able to resell often
wound up being repossessed after lapsing into tax and mortgage
arrears.34 In response, the City declared a moratorium on residential
building sales in 1978.35 The increased number of foreclosures, coupled
with an inability to sell, quickly made the City its own biggest landlord.36
28 Christopher J. Allred, Breaking the Cycle of Abandonment: Using a Tax Enforcement
Tool to Return Distressed Properties to Sound Private Ownership, PIONEER INST. 1–3
(2000), https://pioneerinstitute.org/download/2000-better-government-competition.
29 Id.
30 Id. Typically, a court must enter a judgment of foreclosure in order for a
municipality to foreclose on a property in satisfaction of outstanding property taxes or
other municipal arrears. The court enters an in rem judgment against the property itself,
which allows a municipality to take the property, and evict whoever lives there. Because
the court enters judgment only against the property, the municipality is not able to sue
the property owner for money. Instead the property itself satisfies any outstanding
debt. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 764–65.
31 Braconi, supra note 14, at 97.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 98.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 JOHN C. LIU, N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, THE NEW YORK CITY TAX LIEN SALE: HISTORY AND IMPACT
3 (2012), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/NYC_TaxLien
Report_v8.pdf. By 1994, the City of New York was responsible for the management of
5,458 buildings representing 51,672 units. Allred, supra note 28, at 2–3. Many other
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B. Disposition: Pre-1993 Strategies to Reduce the Number of
Buildings Owned by New York City
During its heightened use of in rem foreclosure as its primary tax
enforcement mechanism, the City developed several core disposition
strategies to try to prevent a proliferation of troubled buildings under
its management: tenant ownership, local nonprofit ownership, and
private for-profit ownership.37
One ambitious strategy pursued by the City was to transfer
ownership of abandoned buildings to tenants. Through HPD’s Tenant
Interim Lease (TIL) program, which started in 1978, tenants of
abandoned buildings subject to in rem foreclosure proceedings could
petition HPD to take over ownership and management of their
building.38 If enough tenants signed a resolution seeking ownership,
they would be charged with managing the building for a trial period of
eleven months, with technical assistance and training from a nonprofit
contracted with HPD for those purposes.39 If the City deemed the
management successful, HPD would sell the building to a Housing
Development Fund Corporation (HDFC) for $250 per dwelling unit.
HDFCs were created under Article XI of the New York State Private
Housing Finance Law.40 To qualify as an HDFC, an entity must (1) offer
low-income housing; (2) use all earnings for entity purposes; and (3)
not use any net earnings of the entity for the benefit of an individual,
firm, corporation, or association.41 By 1996, more than 600 in rem
buildings had been sold to tenants through the TIL program to be turned
into HDFCs.42 Unfortunately, many HDFCs have fallen into various
states of disrepair due in part to some degree of mismanagement by

cities have found themselves in similar predicaments. For example, it was estimated
that the City of Detroit’s Land Bank Authority owned 68 percent of the more than 43,000
vacant homes in the City in 2018. Sarah Alvarez, Real Estate is Hot in Detroit. But its Top
Owner, the City, Isn’t Selling., MICH. RADIO (Aug. 23, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://
www.michiganradio.org/post/real-estate-hot-detroit-its-top-owner-city-isn-t-selling.
37 See Braconi, supra note 14, at 103–04.
38 Id. at 104; see also TIL Tenant Associations, N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF HOUSING PRES. & DEV.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/services-and-information/tenant-associations.page
(last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
39 See SIEGEL TEITELBAUM & EVANS LLP, BROKEN PROMISE: NEW YORK CITY’S TENANT INTERIM
LEASE PROGRAM AND THOSE LEFT BEHIND 13 (2017), http://stellp.com/TIL%20report.pdf.
40 N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 573 (2020).
41 N.Y.C. COUNCIL, REP. OF THE COMM. ON HOUS. & BLDGS. (Apr. 26, 2018) [hereinafter
HDFC REPORT], https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/View.ashx?M=F&ID=6216098&GUID=
12E88E1E-7C5E-4673-986A-19E514A5668B.
42 Braconi, supra note 14, at 104.
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irresponsible boards.43 But much of the blame can and should be placed
with the City, which over-assessed the value of TIL buildings, subjecting
them to unmanageable tax burdens.44 The City further tied tenants’
hands by requiring 40 percent of the proceeds from any unit sales to be
“returned” to the City.45 Though many TIL buildings were in a state of
disrepair when tenants acquired them, the majority are financially
sound today.46
A second approach HPD employs to transfer in rem buildings is to
contract a private nonprofit company, usually organized under Article
XI of the State Private Housing Finance Law, to manage a cluster of
buildings for a few years.47 During that time, the nonprofit rehabilitates
the building before selling it for a nominal sum or turning it over to a
tenant cooperative.48 Buildings turned over to nonprofits have faced
similar problems to HDFCs. Due to extremely low initial rents, many
have failed to keep pace with rising operating costs.49
The third, and most controversial strategy employed by HPD, is the
disposition of city-owned buildings to private, for-profit developers.50
Under the Private Ownership and Management Program (POMP), HPD
contracted with private, for-profit developers to manage in rem
buildings for a year.51 During that year, the developers were in charge
of repairing the building and removing code violations.52 If HPD was
satisfied with the building’s management during that period, it would
offer the developer an option to purchase the building for $2,500 per
unit.53 Buildings conveyed through POMP were placed under rent
stabilization upon sale.54 Many progressive advocates argued for-profit
ownership was inconsistent with the provision of low-income

43 See Nikita Stewart, Under City Program, Renters-Turned-Homeowners Could
Become Renters Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/29/nyregion/co-op-low-income-nyc-rent.html.
44 Braconi, supra note 14, at 105.
45 Id.
46 HDFC COAL., PROPOSALS TO PRESERVE HDFC COOPERATION HOUSING: HDFC SHAREHOLDERS
CAN LEAD THE WAY 1 (June 22, 2016), https://www.hdfccoalition.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/11/HDFC-Coalition-Position-Paper-Vers-5.1-JM-11.22.2016.pdf.
47 Braconi, supra note 14, at 105.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 106.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Braconi, supra note 14, at 107.
54 Id.
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housing.55 Furthermore, many criticized the continued presence of code
violations in buildings that had been sold through POMP, as well as
complaining of owners’ overreliance on eviction proceedings to bring
stability to rent rolls.56
The City’s multifaceted disposition efforts failed to unload troubled
buildings as fast as it was acquiring them through in rem foreclosures.
By 1994, it still “owned and managed 5,458 buildings,” most of which
were dilapidated, multi-family buildings housing low-income
individuals.57 An assessment of the costs associated with the City’s in
rem stock revealed it spent an average of $2.2 million to acquire,
“manage, repair, and sell each building.”58 In addition, the City lost an
average of $209,000 in tax revenues per property.59 Despite the City’s
substantial investment, many of the properties still had significant
physical maintenance deficiencies.60 And once New York courts began
holding the City to the same standards as private landlords, continued
ownership of these properties became an even greater liability.61 Given
the substantial capital outlay and the corresponding poor results, the
City declared a moratorium on in rem foreclosures in 1993.62 In an effort
to improve the housing stock without having to rely on taking control of
these properties, the City created the TPT program.63
C. Third Party Transfer (TPT)
In 1994, HPD convened a group of tax and housing policy experts
to develop a better strategy to address the problem of tax delinquency
while also addressing the capital needs of distressed residential
properties.64 “The group recommended the City sell the liens on all tax

Id.
Id. at 107–08.
57 Allred, supra note 28, at 2.
58 LIU, supra note 36, at 3.
59 Allred, supra note 28, at 3.
60 Id.
61 See Lacks v. City of New York, 607 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(holding the obligation to keep residential dwellings in good repair under New York
Multiple Dwelling Law Section 78 applies equally to the City of New York in its capacity
as owner of in rem residential dwellings); City of New York v. Rodriguez, 461 N.Y.S.2d
149, 152 (N.Y. App. Term 1983) (holding the implied warranty of habitability applied
equally to City of New York as landlord as it does to private landlords).
62 Allred, supra note 28, at 3.
63 Id. at 4.
64 Id. at 3.
55
56
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delinquent properties.”65 Aware of the City’s dire need for affordable
housing,66 however, the group knew selling liens would do nothing to
improve conditions for tenants living in distressed buildings.67
Accordingly, the group also recommended the City exempt distressed
properties from the tax lien sale and instead transfer them to new
ownership.68 The new owners would then carry out the rehabilitation
work with a combination of public and private financing.
In 1996, the City Council made two significant changes to New
York’s tax enforcement scheme. First, it reinstated the City’s ability to
sell tax liens, which would allow the City to recoup unpaid taxes faster
and without the expense of taking control of buildings.69 Second, “in
order to improve and preserve housing affordable to low- to moderateincome households,” the Council altered the City’s in rem foreclosure
process to allow it to transfer the title of foreclosed buildings to eligible
third parties.70 With this new authority, the City could foreclose on any
property subject to municipal liens and transfer them to a third party to
rehabilitate and manage as part of the City’s affordable housing stock.71
It would exercise this authority through TPT.
When executed as intended, TPT allows HPD to exercise its
foreclosure authority strategically and target city funds toward fixing up
the most distressed properties. To date, the City has transferred
approximately 520 buildings, representing more than 6,000 units,
through ten separate “rounds” of TPT.72
Under local law, New York City is able to foreclose upon (1) noncooperative and non-condominium residential properties with a tax lien
outstanding for at least one year; and (2) cooperative and condominium
properties with outstanding tax liens for at least three years.73 When
selecting properties for TPT, “HPD ‘carries out a comprehensive analysis
Id.
The housing vacancy rate in New York City was approximately 3.4 percent at the
time. Id.
67 Id.
68 Allred, supra note 28, at 3.
69 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 26 (1996).
70 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 37 (1996); see also N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFF., SAVING HOMES:
CITY SPENDING ON HOUSING PRESERVATION GROWS 6 (2003), https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/
iboreports/antiabandonment.pdf.
71 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-401.1; Third Party Transfer (TPT) In Rem Program,
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/property-in-remforclosure.page (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
72 TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 8, 31 (statement of Louise Carroll, Comm’r, N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev.).
73 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 11-401(3), 11-404.
65
66
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of eligible buildings to determine which ones are [sic] exhibit the highest
level of physical and financial distress,’ focusing on properties that meet
the tax lien requirements set forth in local law and that are active in
enforcement programs and/or are statutorily distressed.”74
When the most recent round of TPT began in 2015, a property was
considered “statutorily distressed” if it had a lien-to-value ratio equal to
or greater than 15 percent and met at least one of the following criteria:
• the property had an average of five or more hazardous
(Class B) or immediately hazardous violations per
dwelling unit; or
• the property was subject to a lien or liens for $1,000 or more
for any expenses incurred by HPD under its Emergency
Repair Program (“ERP”).75
HPD has also contended it is authorized to foreclose on properties
regardless of whether they meet the above definition of distress.76
As part of the in rem foreclosure process, City law requires the
Commissioner of the DOF to prepare a list of properties with delinquent
taxes, “within a particular borough or section of a tax map,” subject to
foreclosure as described above, provided that none of the areas
specified are “smaller than a [tax] block.”77 “The City interprets this
provision to mean [it must foreclose on] all tax delinquent properties in
a particular tax class on the same tax block as any other property
selected.”78 This means a property need not meet the statutory
74 N.Y.C. COUNCIL, BRIEFING PAPER OF THE OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE AND
INFRASTRUCTURE DIVISION 4 (July 22, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted)
[hereinafter TPT REPORT] (citations omitted), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/
View.ashx?M=F&ID=7550500&GUID=4624FD21-225C-41C2-B62D-F2DAC93F7B7D.
75 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-401(4).
76 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 5.
77 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-405(a). A “tax map” includes “the block map of taxes and
assessments to the extent that the territory within the city of New York is or shall be
embraced in such map.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-203(a). A “block” is a:
[P]lot or parcel of land such as is commonly so designated in the city,
wholly embraced within the continuous lines of streets, or streets and
waterfront taken together where water forms one of the boundaries of a
block, and such other parcels of land or land under water as may be
indicated by the department of finance upon such tax maps by block
numbers as constituting blocks.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-204(d).
78 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 6 (citing Dec. 3, 2018 Letter from the N.Y.C. Law
Dep’t at 2, In Rem Tax Foreclosure Action No. 52, Index No. 40000/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)
(citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-405 and stating:
[T]he law does not . . . prevent properties that are not “distressed” from
being forced in in rem proceedings . . . [U]pon commencement of an in rem
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definition of “distressed” to be included in a foreclosure action. Instead,
“all that is necessary is that the property have a tax lien and be located
on the same block as another property designated for foreclosure.”79
Once the list is finalized, the City files in rem foreclosure actions in the
Supreme Court of each borough, which include all the properties
identified by the Commissioner for tax foreclosure in each borough.80
The City claims to send tax bills and warning notices to
homeowners at risk of foreclosure prior to filing a foreclosure action.81
Owners of properties subject to foreclosure are afforded the
opportunity to pay the full amount of taxes outstanding or enter into an
installment payment agreement to have their properties removed from
TPT.82
Once an in rem foreclosure action has been filed, the City is
required to mail additional foreclosure notices to all homeowners
whose properties have been included in the action, and to publish the
notices of foreclosure in newspapers and to post them in courthouses
and other conspicuous places in the boroughs in which the properties
are located.83 At this point, an owner can still remove their property
from the program by either paying the full amount of taxes outstanding
or entering into an installment payment agreement.84 The terms of such
agreements become more onerous as time passes in the TPT process.85
A court will ultimately issue a final judgment of foreclosure
awarding possession of the properties remaining in the in rem action
and authorizing DOF to convey the property deeds to a third-party
owner.86 Once a court enters a judgment of foreclosure, a homeowner
has four months to redeem their property by paying all outstanding
taxes.87 DOF, in consultation with HPD, also has the discretion to allow
tax foreclosure action, the City is required to include all tax delinquent
properties in a particular tax class in the same tax block as any property
selected.)).
79 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 6.
80 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-405(d).
81 Third Party Transfer (TPT) In Rem Program, supra note 71; Hearing Before the
N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Hous. and Bldgs., 2018–21 N.Y.C. Council 26 (Apr. 26, 2018)
(statement of Associate Commissioner of HPD).
82 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-405(c); Third Party Transfer (TPT) In Rem Program, N.Y.C.
DEP’T OF FIN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/taxes/property-in-rem-forclosure.
page (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
83 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-406.
84 Id. §§ 11-407, 11-409.
85 Third Party Transfer (TPT) In Rem Program, supra note 71.
86 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-412.1(b).
87 Id. § 11-412.1(d).
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a homeowner to enter into an installment payment agreement at this
time if the homeowner has not previously defaulted on a payment
agreement for that property.88
Before transferring title to foreclosed upon properties to a third
party, the DOF notifies the City Council of the proposed transfers.89 The
Council then has forty-five days to review the proposed transfers and
either approve or disapprove.90 If the Council does not act, the transfers
are deemed approved.91 If the Council wishes to disapprove of a
particular transfer, it passes a local law to that effect, and the specific
property or properties remain with the original owner, and all taxes
remain outstanding.92
For properties not removed by the Council, the next step is
ownership transfer to Neighborhood Restore Housing Development
Fund Corporation (“Neighborhood Restore”), “a nonprofit organization
that oversees a variety of affordable housing development programs . . .
that focus on transitioning properties from financial and physical
abandonment to third-party ownership.”93 This transfer extinguishes
all outstanding taxes on the property and must occur between four and
eight months after a court enters final judgment of foreclosure.94
Neighborhood Restore works with developers selected by HPD to
stabilize the properties and plan for their rehabilitation.95 Ultimately,
Neighborhood Restore transfers ownership to the selected developer,
who is then responsible for rehabilitating the building, if necessary, and
managing the property as affordable rental housing.96
TPT is an innovative approach to in rem foreclosure that has had a
tremendously positive effect on the preservation of quality affordable
housing while also encouraging property tax compliance.97 Given the
88 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF FIN. RULES § 13-02(b)-(c). This prohibition on owners who have
defaulted on prior payment plans does not apply to Housing Development Fund
Corporations. Id. § 13-02(c).
89 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 7.
90 Id. at 7–8.
91 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-412.2.
92 Id.
93 What is Neighborhood Restore?, NEIGHBORHOOD RESTORE HOUS. DEV. FUND CORP.,
http://www.neighborhoodrestore.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
94 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 11-401(4), 11-412.1(c).
95 Affordable Housing Development and Rehabilitation, NEIGHBORHOOD RESTORE HOUS.
DEV. FUND CORP., http://www.neighborhoodrestore.org/work/#affordable (last visited
Apr. 21, 2022).
96 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 8.
97 See TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 31, 34 (statement of Louise Carroll, Comm’r,
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev.).
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dire consequences to homeowners of being completely divested of their
property, however, a critical look at the program’s real-world impact is
necessary.
III. TPT ROUND X: THE IMPACT OF TPT IN MODERN-DAY NEW YORK
In 2015, the City selected 420 properties for Round X of TPT.98
Three years later, in the fall of 2018, the City transferred sixty-five of
those properties to Neighborhood Restore.99 Of the 420 properties
included in the round, most responded to notice and were removed,
resulting in the collection of approximately $40 million of outstanding
arrears.100
Despite the built-in procedural backstops—clear notice provisions,
payment agreements, the redemption period, and City Council review—
the round drew extensive criticism.101 Several of the 420 properties
initially targeted in Round X, like the Saunders’ home,102 were not in the
kind of severe physical or financial distress alleged to be the concern of
the program as originally conceived.103 Many homeowners complained
of a lack of notice or opportunity to address the arrears that formed the
basis for the transfer of their property.104 Furthermore, some elected
officials raised concerns about the potential disparate impact the
program seemed to have on communities of color, divesting
homeowners in black and brown neighborhoods of their equity while
leaving predominantly white neighborhoods largely untouched.105

TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 9.
Id.
100 TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 34.
101 See Joe Mauceri, New Yorkers in Debt Losing Their Homes As Part of Program
Designed to Preserve Quality Affordable Housing, PIX11 (Dec. 12, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://pix11.com/2018/12/11/new-yorkers-in-debt-losing-their-homes-as-part-ofprogram-designed-to-preserve-quality-affordable-housing/; City Council Housing Chair
Expresses Concern over Mayor’s Plan to Expand Seizure of Private Residential Properties,
N.Y.C. COUNCIL (Jan. 10, 2019), https://council.nyc.gov/robert-cornegy/2019/01/10/
housing-chair-concerned-by-expansion-of-property-seizures/.
102 After pressure from the Chair of the Council’s Committee on Housing & Buildings,
the City ultimately coordinated with Neighborhood Restore to have the deed to the
Saunders home transferred back to the family. Kathleen Culliton, City Returns Home It
Snatched from Crown Heights Senior, PATCH.COM (Jan. 11, 2019, 6:01 PM), https://
patch.com/new-york/prospectheights/city-returns-home-it-snatches-crown-heightssenior.
103 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 3.
104 Id. at 9.
105 See, e.g., TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 11 (statement of Council Member Ritchie
Torres).
98
99
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Many of the properties selected for inclusion in Round X appeared
to be in fine physical and financial condition,106 much like the Saunders’
home. Half of the properties selected for Round X fell below the 15
percent lien-to-value ratio required by the statutory definition of
distress.107 In fact, the average lien-to-value ratio of those properties
was only 3 percent, well below the 15 percent statutory threshold for
distress.108 The total market value of these properties was $152 million,
while the total outstanding arrears were just $4.5 million.109 One
hundred and fifty-five of the properties did not have the requisite
number of housing code violations required by local law.110 In the end,
four of the properties transferred had lien-to-value ratios below fifteen
percent and, therefore, were not statutorily distressed.111
When a property like the Saunders’ home is taken through TPT, as
with some tax foreclosure schemes generally, the property owners face
losing the equity they have accumulated over many decades without
receiving any compensation.112 Apart from the constitutional takings
concern this raises,113 it has the effect of depriving a family of a
significant intergenerational asset. For many Americans, especially
homeowners of color, the equity they have accumulated in their homes
is the primary source of wealth.114 Thus, any municipal program that
might divest them of this asset must be appropriately tailored to avoid
such a harsh result.
As outlined in Part II, HDFCs were a unique solution to a problem
that grew out of the City’s early use of in rem foreclosure.115 Their
creation had the dual benefit of removing in rem properties from the
City’s ledger while also creating long-term affordable housing for lowincome New Yorkers. Because the current New York City tax lien sale
See TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 9.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 10.
110 Id. at 9.
111 Id.
112 See Enright, supra note 2, at 669.
113 See In Rem Tax Foreclosure Action No. 53 Borough of Brooklyn, No. 8700/15, slip
op. at 8–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2019).
114 See Jing Fu, Homeownership is Key to Household Wealth, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME
BUILDERS (Mar. 22, 2018), https://eyeonhousing.org/2018/03/homeownership-is-keyto-household-wealth/?_ga=2.170470632.910417077.1605473507179102064.1605473507.
115 Michelle Higgins, Bargains With a ‘But,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/realestate/affordable-new-york-apartments-with-acatch.html.
106
107
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process specifically exempts HDFCs,116 the City’s only option for “HDFCs
with outstanding arrears is to put the buildings through the TPT
process.”117 In Round X, 118 of the properties selected for foreclosure,
and “27 of the 65 properties that were foreclosed upon” were HDFCs.118
The practical implication of an HDFC transfer through TPT is that the
building converts from a cooperative to a rental building. This means
the shareholders in such properties, many of whom spent years
rehabilitating and maintaining them when the City no longer wanted to,
stand to lose ownership of their units as a result of TPT.
While most of the HDFCs selected for Round X were statutorily
distressed, it is unclear if the City pursued enough other measures to
ensure tax compliance, thus avoiding the need to foreclose upon these
buildings.119 The City’s handling of HDFC rehabilitation is of particular
note because HPD “anticipate[s] Round 11 of TPT will include even
more HDFC coops.”120
Another concern that came out of Round X was the concentration
of selected properties in certain neighborhoods,121 which gave the
impression that the City had targeted homeowners of color.122 While
the City vehemently denied such targeted enforcement, City data
showed that TPT overwhelmingly targeted properties in just eleven
neighborhoods, including thirty-two properties in the Saunders’
neighborhood of Crown Heights123—a vibrant, majority Black
neighborhood in central Brooklyn. The City targeted no properties from
the borough of Staten Island,124 where white people represent 76.3
percent of the population.125
While there is no clear evidence to suggest the City was targeting
homeowners of color, it is worth noting the disparate impact in rem
foreclosures typically has on homeowners of color. Studies have shown

N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 11-319(b)(10), 11-401.1(a).
TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 12.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 13.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 13–14.
122 See, e.g., Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6, Dorce v. City of New York, No. 20-1809 (2d Cir. Sept.
3, 2020).
123 TPT REPORT, supra note 74, at 14.
124 Id. at 13.
125 QuickFacts: Richmond County (Staten Island Borough), New York, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (last visited Apr. 21, 2022), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/richmond
countystatenislandboroughnewyork.
116
117
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that “property tax foreclosures are highly concentrated among lowincome communities with large African American and Latino
populations.”126 In fact, evidence suggests municipalities tend to overassess the taxable value of property owned by people of color.127 More
can and must be done to ensure municipalities are not unintentionally
contributing to the displacement of people of color through the
administration of their tax assessment and enforcement policies.
While HPD claimed to have provided more generous notice and
redemption arrangements than required by law in Round X,
homeowners of properties included in Round X argued the City
provided them with little notice and insufficient opportunities to
redeem their properties.128 According to the City, “[e]ach building with
outstanding property taxes and water and sewer charges [in Round X
was] proactively contacted by the city, a minimum of 70 times since the
beginning of the rounds in 2015, including notices, letters, bills,
robocalls and direct . . . outreach.”129 Specifically, the City stated that
“[i]n addition to the standard property tax and water or sewer bills, each
owner received multiple letters that indicated that their property was
subject to transfer through TPT” and “HPD also made robocalls in
English and Spanish and offered property owner clinics to provide
further information and assistance.”130
Some homeowners involved in Round X alleged they did not
receive notice that their properties were slated for foreclosure.131 In
one lawsuit, a homeowner claimed that she was unaware the City
foreclosed on her building until she received a copy of a flyer posted at
the property stating the City transferred it to Neighborhood Restore.132
As outlined above, homeowners have up to four months after
foreclosure to redeem their property by paying all outstanding
arrears133 or by entering into an installment payment agreement with
the City to do so.134 Some of the homeowners whose properties were
126 JOHN RAO, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., THE OTHER FORECLOSURE CRISIS: PROPERTY TAX LIEN
SALES 5 (2012).
127 See generally Carlos Avenancio-Leon & Troup Howard, The Assessment Gap: Racial
Inequalities in Property Taxation 22 (Dec. 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3465010.
128 See, e.g., In Rem Tax Foreclosure Action No. 53 Borough of Brooklyn, No. 8700/15,
slip op. at 8–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2019).
129 Hearing Before the N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Hous. and Bldgs., supra note 81.
130 Id.
131 See In Rem Tax Foreclosure Action No. 53 Borough of Brooklyn, slip op. at 1.
132 Id. at 14.
133 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 11-412.1(d).
134 19 RCNY § 13-02(b), (c).
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included in Round X, however, claimed that the City inhibited their
efforts to redeem their properties.135 For example, one homeowner was
unable to pay her taxes because the City had improperly recorded the
owner of the property, despite the homeowner’s repeated attempts to
resolve the issue.136 Other homeowners claimed the City disregarded
their payment agreements and foreclosed upon their properties
anyway.137 In some cases, the City accepted payments from the owners
of properties already foreclosed upon. The City even admitted to
accepting approximately $72,000 in payments from an HDFC postforeclosure, $21,000 of which they accepted after shareholders could no
longer legally redeem the property.138
Ultimately, the experiences of Round X demonstrate that, despite
good intentions, the use of in rem foreclosure can have grave
consequences. Even in a comprehensive in rem foreclosure program
like TPT with clear notice provisions, installment payment options, a
four-month redemption period, and review by the City Council, property
owners can become collateral damage.
IV. WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T
There is much to be learned from New York City’s experience with
the TPT program. Given the City’s long history with in rem foreclosure
and affordable housing, the City does some things well, but other areas
have room for improvement.
First, HPD offers many resources aimed at assisting property
owners to ensure that their buildings are kept in good repair and that
they can stay current on their property taxes.139 The Landlord
Ambassadors program offers “technical assistance and emergency loans
to small building owners.”140 The Homeowners HelpDesk assists with
foreclosure prevention, guidance on scam avoidance, and advice on
home repair, among other programs.141 And through the HomeFix

See, e.g., In Rem Tax Foreclosure Action No. 53 Borough of Brooklyn, slip op. at 12
(“[T]his is not a case where a landlord has made no effort to maintain the property.
Rather, the shareholders and board [of the property] are desperately seeking to
maintain and rehabilitate the . . . property and to pay all outstanding sums due, obviating
the need for any transfer under [TPT].”).
136 Id. at 13–14.
137 Id. at 3–4.
138 Id. at 23.
139 TPT Hearing, supra note 16, at 36.
140 Id.
141 Id.
135
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program, HPD provides low-cost loans to struggling homeowners.142
Second, the City has observed many recommended best practices for its
in rem foreclosure program,143 like offering HDFCs retroactive property
tax abatements and implementing installment payment agreements for
municipal arrears.144 Third, the City does allow the residents of certain
properties subject to TPT to petition to become HDFCs, which offers the
kind of homeownership opportunities that might otherwise be
threatened by the program’s conversion of HDFCs into rental units.
Finally, New York City has made a strong commitment to the creation of
permanently affordable housing in the past few years. Through changes
in City policy and recent changes to rent stabilization laws on the state
level, the City now requires longer affordability terms in affordable
housing development deals.145
Typically, City-funded affordable housing is subject to regulatory
agreements that mandate rents in particular units remain affordable to
low-income people for a certain period of years. At the end of that term,
however, developers can choose to opt out of the affordability
arrangement and transition the units to market rate rents.146 Now, the
City faces an “expiring use crisis” as the units created during the Koch
Administration of the 1980s reach the end of their affordability terms
and private developers opt to make them market rate apartments.147
Fortunately, data suggests nonprofit community developers are
significantly more likely than private developers to renew their

Id.
See RAO, supra note 126, at 5–7.
144 HDFC REPORT, supra note 41, at 5.
145 See STEPHANIE SOSA-KALTER, ASS’N FOR NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT,
MAXIMIZING THE PUBLIC VALUE OF NEW YORK CITY-FINANCED AFFORDABLE HOUSING 21 (2019),
https://anhd.org/report/maximizing-public-value-new-york-city-financed-affordablehousing.
146 Until recently, the standard affordability term required for City-funded
development was thirty years. Id. Typically, developers sought Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits (LIHTC) and Private Activity Bonds (PAB) to fund these projects. Id. at 10.
The LIHTC is issued to state governments by the federal government and awarded to
private developers through a competitive process. What Is the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit and How Does It Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefingbook/what-low-income-housing-tax-credit-and-how-does-it-work (last visited Apr. 21,
2022). Developers then sell the credits to private investors to obtain funding. Once the
development is complete, the investors can then claim the tax credit. Id. PABs are taxexempt bonds issued by or on behalf of state or local governments to raise money to
fund certain projects like affordable housing developments. Private Activity Bond (PAB),
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateactivitybond.asp (last
visited Mar. 10, 2022).
147 SOSA-KALTER, supra note 145, at 10.
142
143
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affordability terms,148 and the City’s trend toward prioritizing deals with
such community-based developers means the problem of expiring use
can be largely avoided in the future.
Even still, much of the City’s TPT program needs improvement.
First, there are shortcomings in the City’s ability to provide effective
notice to homeowners. The fact that most properties exited TPT
suggests notice was effective for most of the affected property owners.
But the problems highlighted with several properties indicate the City’s
notice provisions are far from perfect.
Second, the complex bureaucratic matrix of the program wherein
multiple different agencies administer municipal charges could result in
a property being subject to foreclosure. Coupled with City staff who are
entirely unaware of the program’s existence, this means property
owners are at risk of being unable to redeem their property before it is
foreclosed on. This problem is exacerbated by what appeared to be a
selective application of the City’s discretion to allow redemption of
certain properties toward the end of Round X.
Finally, while the City largely transferred the properties ultimately
foreclosed on to nonprofit community developers, the fact remains that
in many cases, homeowner equity was traded for affordable rental units.
Moreover, some properties were actually transferred to private
developers, meaning the City stands to lose affordable housing due to
limited affordability terms like those associated with LIHTC-financed
development.
V. WHAT CAN BE DONE
First, the City should restrict the foreclosure of properties through
TPT to those that meet the statutory definition of distress. The City
argues that it has the discretion to transfer property with any amount of
outstanding arrears, and that where a property is located on the same
tax block as a distressed property, it must be included in TPT.149 The
City Council should re-introduce and pass Int. 1594 of 2019, a bill
introduced by a Brooklyn councilman, which would remove the
requirement that selected parcels not be smaller than tax blocks.150
Where other properties may have property tax delinquency, the City
should channel its resources to outreach instead of foreclosure.
Second, the City should increase the resources available to
property owners before moving to foreclose. The City expends
148
149
150

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 78.
N.Y.C. Int. No. 1594 (Jan. 9, 2019).
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tremendous staff time and money to coordinate the TPT program,
including resources it brings to bear in the ultimate rehabilitation
process.
The City should leverage more of this funding for
improvements and property tax assistance on the front end, instead of
penalizing property owners by moving to foreclose and transfer these
properties to developers. Where property records suggest a particular
delinquent property owner may be vulnerable (e.g., elderly, disabled,
etc.), the City should enlist the help of social service agencies to conduct
outreach and connect property owners with resources that can help
them address financial matters to avoid foreclosure.151
Where foreclosure is absolutely necessary, the City should
prioritize the transfer of properties to land banks, which in conjunction
with community land trusts (CLTs), and mutual housing associations
(MHAs), can ensure permanent affordability, ownership opportunities,
and community control that private developers cannot. These
strategies have demonstrated promise in other localities152 and, when
used in conjunction, offer a better way for New York City to prevent
displacement resulting from the many ongoing crises facing its housing
market.
First, New York City should establish a land bank.153 A land bank is
a nonprofit corporation created by local law that aggregates vacant,
abandoned, and tax delinquent parcels of land for future sale and
development.154 Generally, land banks are granted special power and
legal authority, which allow municipalities the flexibility to return such
problem properties to productive use.155 These powers include the
ability to obtain property at low or no cost through foreclosure; to hold
land tax-free; to extinguish back taxes and other arrears; to lease
properties for temporary uses; and to negotiate sales based on
RAO, supra note 126, at 6.
See Dan Wu & Sheila R. Foster, From Smart Cities to Co-Cities: Emerging Legal and
Policy Responses to Urban Vacancy, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 909, 921–22 (2020); Alese
Bagdol, Note, Property Taxes and Community Land Trusts: A Middle Ground, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 939, 942 (2013); Diana A. Silva, Note, Land Banking as a Tool for the Economic
Redevelopment of Older Industrial Cities, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 607, 620–21 (2011).
153 A bill to establish a New York City land bank was previously introduced in the
New York City Council with the express goal of “acquiring, warehousing and transferring
real property to develop, rehabilitate and preserve affordable housing.” See N.Y.C. Int.
No. 118 (Jan. 31, 2018).
154 See Land Banks, NAT’L COMMUNITY STABILIZATION TR., http://www.stabilization
trust.org/get-involved/land-banks (last visited Apr. 21, 2022); Land Bank FAQ’s, CTR. FOR
CMTY. PROGRESS, https://communityprogress.org/resources/land-banks/lb-faq/ (last
visited Apr. 21, 2022).
155 Land Bank FAQ’s, CTR. FOR CMTY. PROGRESS, https://communityprogress.org/
resources/land-banks/lb-faq/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
151
152
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outcomes deemed to be in the public interest, such as the creation of
affordable housing.156
Land banking folds nicely into the mechanisms already created by
TPT to foreclose on tax delinquent properties and clear title. Instead of
transferring title to private developers in exchange for affordable
housing set asides, the City could transfer title to a land bank.157 A New
York City land bank could be seeded with the 1,459 vacant, unutilized
properties the City already owns.158 A 2016 report by the New York City
Comptroller estimated these properties alone could support the
creation of 53,116 units of permanently affordable housing.159 As
distressed properties are identified by HPD for inclusion in TPT, they
could be funneled to a City land bank instead of being transferred to
third parties to develop housing with affordability guaranteed for only
a period of years. To better effectuate permanent affordability, a New
York City land bank should be used in conjunction with the growing
network of community land trusts cropping up in the City.160
Like land banks, CLTs are nonprofit organizations geared toward
marshaling land for community uses, such as creating and preserving
affordable housing.161 CLTs differ from land banks in two important
ways. First, CLTs maintain permanent ownership of land, while land
banks transfer vacant and undeveloped properties to third parties.162
Instead of selling properties, CLTs enter long-term leases with the
individuals or entities who purchase the building or home atop that
land.163 In return, the CLT regulates the extent of the profit a building
owner is allowed to make from selling the building.164 This regulation
effectively allows the community to set the price of the building,
Id.
OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, BUILDING AN AFFORDABLE FUTURE: THE PROMISE OF A NEW
YORK CITY LAND BANK 12 (2016), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
documents/The_Case_for_A_New_York_City_Land_Bank.pdf.
158 Id. at 5.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 13; see Abigail Savitch-Lew, The N.Y.C. Community Land Trust Movement
Wants to Go Big, CITYLIMITS (Jan. 8, 2018), https://citylimits.org/2018/01/08/the-nyccommunity-land-trust-movement-wants-to-go-big/.
161 See LINDA E. FISHER & JUDITH FOX, THE FORECLOSURE ECHO 181 (2019) (briefly
explaining the CLT model and its benefits in creating affordable property ownership
opportunities).
162 OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, supra note 157, at 13.
163 See FISHER & FOX, supra note 161, at 181; Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y.C. CMTY.
LAND
INITIATIVE,
https://nyccli.org/resources/clts-and-mhas-frequently-askedquestions/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2022).
164 FISHER & FOX, supra note 161, at 181–82.
156
157
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insulating the sale from market inflation and ensuring it remains
affordable for future owners.165
Second, CLTs do not have the broad range of powers typically
conferred on land banks, but rely on purchase and donation to acquire
land.166 In the context of TPT, the City could donate the land on which
TPT buildings sit to CLTs. The CLT, in turn, could then manage the
disposition of the buildings to ensure they are maintained as affordable
housing in perpetuity. This effort could be further augmented by
creating partnerships with mutual housing authorities.
Like CLTs, MHAs are democratically-governed, nonprofit
organizations.167 MHAs, however, are focused on the ownership and
management of housing affordable to low- and very low-income
households.168 MHAs employ a number of strategies to keep housing
costs low, including: sharing resources across multiple buildings,
subsidizing operating costs by renting commercial space, and
purchasing supplies and services in bulk.169 Also, like CLTs, MHAs
restrict the profit individuals make from sales.170 These characteristics
mean the structure of MHAs dovetails nicely with the structure of CLTs.
In fact, MHAs and CLTs could be set up to have interlocking boards,
meaning they can coordinate their efforts to ensure permanent
affordability.171
To better serve the dual goals of property tax compliance and
affordable housing preservation without exacerbating displacement
and gentrification, New York City must rethink its approach to tax
foreclosures, especially the TPT program. First, the City can and should
adopt Intro. 1594 to prevent buildings with small amounts of municipal
arrears from being swept into the TPT program just because they are on
the same tax block as a truly distressed property. Second, the City
should marshal the resources of its many social service agencies to
better protect vulnerable property owners from falling behind on
property taxes. And finally, the City should establish a land bank, which
in conjunction with CLTs and MHAs, provides a readymade solution for
ensuring the kind of community-centered ownership and development
165 Chelsea King, Comment, Merging Inclusionary Zoning and Community Land Trust
to Increase Affordable Housing in Baltimore Without Displacing Neighborhoods, 49 U.
BALT. L.F. 43, 59–60 (2018).
166 OFF. OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER, supra note 157, at 13.
167 N.Y.C. CMTY. LAND INITIATIVE, supra note 163.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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necessary to create permanently affordable housing and
homeownership opportunities for the increasing number of New
Yorkers struggling to afford a home.
VI. CONCLUSION
The importance of property tax revenues to municipal budgets
means tax foreclosures are here to stay. But the affordable housing
crisis facing cities like New York, especially in the wake of the
cataclysmic economic threat posed by the global coronavirus pandemic,
requires thoughtful, proactive solutions that do not just kick the can
down the road by offering sweetheart deals to private developers. To
be sure, TPT was an innovative approach to addressing the widespread
abandonment and neglect plaguing New York City for the decades
preceding its creation. But changing circumstances, and an enhanced
understanding of other mechanisms for land and housing development,
make clear that TPT needs changing. In particular, the creation of a land
bank and the transfer of properties to CLTs and MHAs for the
preservation and management of truly permanent affordable housing
would go a long way to addressing the current shortcomings of the
program. These changes would make TPT a model that other
municipalities can adopt as they seek to address their own budget
shortfalls and dwindling stocks of affordable housing.

